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1.  Introduction 
One  of  the  key  questions  regarding  immigration  concerns  its  benefits  and  costs  for  the 
receiving economies. Fears that immigration may, at least in the short  run, have adverse 
effects on the labour market opportunities of the resident population are a main reason for 
opposition to more liberal migration policies. Figure 1, which is drawn from data from the 
European  Social  Survey,  suggests  that  there  is  indeed  some  concern  among  residents  in 
receiving  countries  that  immigration  is  detrimental  to  their  wages.  The  leftmost  column 
suggests that almost 38% of UK residents agree with the statement that immigration lowers 
wages in the receiving country. Breaking down responses by educational background shows, 
however, that it is mainly the lower skilled who are concerned about detrimental wage effects 
through migration. Almost 50% of individuals with no qualification and over 40% of the low-
qualified fear that immigration may reduce wages, while this concern is shared by only about 
20% of the highly qualified. 
[Figure 1] 
Are these concerns justified? The evidence that immigration does in fact depress wages or 
leads to large negative employment effects is at best mixed. What is certain, however, is that 
wage  responses  to  immigration,  if  they  occur,  will  not  be  distributed  evenly  across  the 
distribution of resident wages, but will be more pronounced in those parts of the distribution 
in which immigrants compete with native workers. We will come back to figure 1 later on, to 
understand whether the differential concern across different education groups is justified.  
In this paper, we briefly review some of the possible mechanisms by which the receiving 
economy may adjust to immigration. The mechanism that has received most attention in the 
economic literature is through factor prices, in particular wages. We will explain under which 
circumstances  immigration  may  lead  to  negative  wage  effects  for  the  native  workforce, 
whose wages will be affected, and when adverse effects may or may not occur. But wage 
adjustments  are  only  one  of  many  mechanisms  by  which  an  economy  may  react  to 
immigration. We will briefly outline some important alternative adjustment channels. 
After setting out the theoretical foundations, we will in the second part of the paper turn to 
the challenges facing the analyst when attempting to estimate the effects immigration may 
have on wages. Here we will in particular discuss problems of identification and how these 
can be solved.   
In the third part, we review some recent research, and discuss the evidence on wage effects of 
immigration in the UK and the international context. 
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2.  The Labour Market Impact of Immigration 
We commence by discussing the possible mechanisms by which immigration may impact on 
wages of the receiving country’s population. We start with the simplest possible economic 
model,  where  wages  are  determined  by  the  country’s  production  technology,  as  well  as 
supply of production factors. We assume that the potential immigration country has only one 
industry and produces only one output good, using both labour and capital.  
The first question that arises is how immigrants enter this model. Some early papers assume 
that immigrants are a distinct factor of production, i.e. labour consists of immigrants and 
natives  (see  e.g.  Grossman  1982),  and  that  immigrants  and  natives  are  not  perfectly 
substitutable. However, it seems quite difficult to argue that two equally qualified workers, 
one a native, and the other one an immigrant, are not easily substitutable in production. It 
seems more reasonable to draw a distinction between different groups of labour inputs along 
the skill dimension.  
Therefore,  later  papers  have  chosen  a  production  technology  that  distinguishes  between 
skilled and unskilled labour, and assumes that immigrants are perfect substitutes with their 
corresponding native skill category. How skills are defined in detail varies by study, but 
typical dimensions are educational attainment (e.g. Altonji and Card 1991; Dustmann, Fabbri 
and Preston 2005), occupation (e.g. Card 2001), or experience and education (e.g. Borjas 
2003). We will start by exploring the economic consequences and predictions of a model of 
this type. 
More recently, some papers have gone a step further and relaxed the assumption of perfect 
substitutability of immigrants and natives within pre-defined skill categories using nested 
production technologies (see e.g. Ottaviano and Peri 2006, and Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth 2006). We will briefly discuss this later.  
 
2.1 Adjustment to Immigration through Wages 
We  distinguish  between  skilled  and  unskilled  workers  who  may  be  natives  (born  in  the 
destination country) or immigrants (born in a country other than the destination country). 
Within a particular skill group immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes, i.e. they are 
interchangeable. The third factor of production is capital and we commence by assuming that 
capital supply is perfectly elastic. This means that firms obtain capital at a fixed interest rate, 
which could be thought of as being set on an international market. Finally, we assume that 
both skilled and unskilled labour supply is perfectly inelastic. This means that workers will 
choose to work at any wage. Again, we will relax this assumption later on. 
Wages: Suppose now that, before immigration occurs, the economy consists of skilled and 
unskilled workers, say in equal proportions, and is in labour market equilibrium in the sense 
that all workers are employed at equilibrium wages, which may vary by skill level. If the 
newly arriving immigrants differ in their skill endowments from native workers, they will 
induce  a  change  in  the  overall  skill  composition  in  the  economy.  For  instance  if  all   3 
immigrants are unskilled, then this will lead to a disequilibrium between supply of and cost-
minimising demand for different labour types at existing wages and output levels. There will 
be an excess supply of unskilled workers at the going wage rate. Absorption of these new 
workers  into  the  economy  and  restoration  of  equilibrium  will  therefore  almost  certainly 
involve short-run changes in wages and employment levels of different skill types.  
A first key observation in this set-up is therefore that immigration only affects wages (and 
possibly employment rates) of resident workers if the skill distribution of immigrants differs 
from that of the native workforce. Only in that case will their inflow lead to changes in the 
relative supply of different skill groups and thus to a disequilibrium in the labour market of 
the host economy. If the skill distribution of immigrants is equal to that of natives and capital 
supply is fully elastic, then immigration will simply lead to an increase in the scale of the 
economy through an increase in output with no effect on wages and employment of natives. 
For  illustration,  we  consider  the  extreme  case  where  all  immigrants  are  unskilled. 
Immigration will now lead to an excess supply of unskilled labour at the pre-immigration 
wages.  Because  unskilled  labour  is  in  excess  supply,  firms  will  be  able  to  satisfy  their 
demand  for  labour  even  at  lower  wages.  This  leads  to  a  decrease  in  wages  of  unskilled 
workers,  which,  in  turn,  increases  demand,  until  all  unskilled  workers  (immigrants  and 
natives) are employed, but at a lower wage than the pre-immigration wage. 
Accordingly, unskilled native workers lose as a consequence of immigration. However, a 
supply  shock  of  unskilled  workers  leads  to  a  relative  scarcity  of  skilled  workers  in  our 
economy, driving up their wages. Skilled workers therefore enjoy a gain from immigration.  
While wages of unskilled workers fall, wages of skilled workers rise. In our simple economy, 
the surplus accruing to skilled workers will be higher than the loss to unskilled workers (with 
the difference often referred to as the ``immigration surplus''). We have demonstrated this in 
Figure 2, concentrating on unskilled workers only. The vertical axis shows wages and the 
horizontal axis employment. In the pre-migration period, all native workers N are employed 
at wages  0 w , and the pre-migration equilibrium is in point A. Immigration of size M leads to 
a shift in the (perfectly inelastic) labour supply schedule. As skilled labour remains constant, 
this  leads  to  a  relative  excess  supply  of  unskilled  labour,  thus  driving  wages  down  the 
marginal product curve D. The new equilibrium is in point B, where wages have decreased to 
1 w . In this new situation, the total output share that goes to unskilled workers has decreased 
by an amount reflected by the area of the rectangle  0 w -A-C- 1 w . This share of output falls 
now to skilled labour. As all unskilled workers including immigrants work at a wage that is 
equal to the marginal product of the last immigrant, immigrants create an additional surplus, 
which is given by the triangle A-B-C and which also falls to skilled native workers. 
[Figure 2] 
 It seems that our simple model suggest that immigration does in the worst case have no 
effect  on  average  wages.  How  does  that  square  up  with  the  common  perception  that 
immigration  is  bad  for  wages  on  average?  Remember  that  we  made  a  key  assumption, 
namely that capital is elastic in supply. This seems to us a reasonable assumption for small   4 
open economies like the UK, and for migrations of the magnitude we usually observe. If we 
give up this assumption, then re-distribution will be not only to skilled labour but also to 
capital, and average wages (not only wages of the unskilled) may decrease as a consequence 
of  immigration.  Thus,  which  effects  on  average  wages  we  expect  within  this  simplest 
possible setting depends on the view we take about capital mobility. 
There is little empirical evidence on how capital flows actually respond to immigrant inflows. 
In their analysis on the wage impact of immigration in the U.S., Ottaviano and Peri (2006) 
explicitly take capital adjustments into account and estimate the speed at which capital reacts 
to deviations from its balanced growth path. Consistent with the evidence from the growth 
and business cycle literature (Islam 1995, Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort 1996, Romer 2006), 
they find a convergence rate of 10% per  year (so that each  year 10% of the immigrant-
induced deviation from the balanced growth path of the capital/labour ratio is eliminated by 
capital inflows) which they point out is likely to be a conservative estimate of the yearly 
speed  of  capital  adjustment,  in  particular  for  open  economies.  In  their  example,  this 
adjustment  speed  means  that  instead  of  reducing  the  capital/labour  ratio  by  11%  and 
consequently average real wages by 3.6%, the immigrant inflows to the U.S. between 1990 
and 2004 only reduced the capital/labour ratio by 3.4% which in turn implies a much smaller 
negative effect of only 1.1% on average wages in the economy. Basically, the faster capital is 
able to adjust, the smaller will be the effect on average wages in the economy. More direct 
evidence linking capital flows directly to immigration is needed. Dependent on the features of 
the destination country and the length of period under study, the assumption of elastic capital 
supply  seems  not  unreasonable.  On  the  other  hand,  the  assumption  of  perfectly  inelastic 
capital supply, which is implicitly often made in this literature, seems too strong to us. 
Employment: One assumption we make above is that workers supply labour whatever the 
wage - we refer to that situation as one where labour supply is completely inelastic. If labour 
supply is somewhat elastic, then some workers will not want to work if wages are decreasing, 
and rather choose unemployment. In this situation, there are equilibrium employment effects. 
Immigration may cause (voluntary) unemployment among native workers whose wages fall. 
We illustrate this in Figure 3. Here the labour supply curve is upward sloping, and an increase 
in labour supply through migration leads to some native workers not being prepared any more 
to work at the new, lower equilibrium wage. These workers (given by N0-N1 in Figure 3) 
remain therefore voluntarily unemployed.  
[Figure 3] 
 
2.2 Alternative Adjustment Mechanisms 
The economy we have characterized above is a one-sector economy, where only one output 
good is produced. Such an economy can only react to a change in the composition of its 
workforce (e.g. due to immigration) through changes in the wage structure. This is clearly a 
strong  simplification  –  economies  are  characterised  by  a  multitude  of  different  sectors, 
producing goods that differ in their capital intensity and in their relative use of skilled versus   5 
unskilled labour. This complexity gives rise to two alternative adjustment mechanisms which 
we will briefly discuss in the next section.  
Output  Mix:  The  first  mechanism  is  reflected  in  the  mix  of  output  goods  the  economy 
produces. Suppose, as before, that immigrants increase the relative supply of unskilled versus 
skilled workers. While in our simple model above the absorption of the additional supply of 
unskilled workers comes about through a decline in unskilled wages, with more than one 
industry there is an additional way of accommodating the increase in unskilled labour supply: 
by increasing production of those output goods that use unskilled labour more intensively 
(Rybczynski 1955). The idea here is the following (see Gaston and Nelson 2000, for a more 
detailed  description):  suppose  the  immigrant  receiving  country  is  a  small  open  economy 
consisting of two industries which each produce an output good that is traded on the world 
market. Assume further that one of the industries is intensive in the use of unskilled labour 
while the other is intensive in the use of skilled labour. As long as the output produced in our 
economy  relative  to  the  overall  world  production  of  the  goods  is  small,  the  small  open 
economy assumption implies that prices for both goods can be assumed as fixed on the world 
market. In such an economy, the increase in unskilled labour supply induced by an immigrant 
inflow will now initially  drive down wages of unskilled workers (and increase wages of 
skilled workers) as in the previous example. However, this change in relative wages now 
leads  to  a  relatively  larger  decrease  in  unit  production  costs  for  the  low-skill  intensive 
industry than for the skill-intensive industry. With output prices fixed, there will be larger 
profits in the low-skill intensive industry. In a perfectly competitive market these profits then 
induce new firms to enter the industry (or firms to move from the skill-intensive to the more 
profitable low-skill intensive industry), expanding its production and increasing the relative 
demand for low-skilled workers. This, in turn, will drive up unskilled wages. Accordingly, 
while the immediate impact of immigration is to lower wages of unskilled workers, in the 
longer run wages will increase again. Assuming the eventual equilibrium continues to involve 
positive  production  in  all  traded  goods  sectors,  wages  should  return  to  the  initial  pre-
immigration equilibrium. However, the adjustment process may be very quick, for instance if 
firms foresee the change in skill composition, or if the required capital for the expanding 
industries is easily available.  Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) refer to this as the hypothesis of 
factor price insensitivity. As a result, the economy will fully absorb the additional unskilled 
workers through an increase in the production of that good that uses unskilled workers more 
intensively without long-term changes in the relative wage structure. These results can be 
generalised to multiple input factors and multiple outputs, and can be extended to the case of 
non-traded goods, with the relevant algebra being detailed in trade theory models (see e.g. 
Ethier  1984,  and  Woodland  1982).  The  key  requirement  to  allow  the  economy  to  react 
through flexibility in its output mix is that there are more traded goods in the economy than 
there are factors of production. 
Technology:  There  is  a  second  adjustment  mechanism  to  immigration.  This  mechanism 
works through technology. The idea is again simple, and can be most easily understood by 
inspecting the production of goods in different countries. Agricultural production of goods 
that are traded in international markets, like rice, differ substantially in their labour intensity   6 
between countries of the developing world, where unskilled labour is abundant, and countries 
of the developed world where unskilled labour is in relatively lower supply. There is a pool 
of production technologies available to produce the same output good. Suppose, as before, 
that  there  are  two  different  industries  which  both  produce  an  output  good  with  a  given 
technology and relative factor intensity. Immigration now leads again to an increase in the 
relative supply of unskilled workers. Faced with this change in labour supply, both industries 
now endogenously select a production technology out of the pool of available technologies 
that is more intensive in the use of unskilled labour. By changing production technologies, 
the economy will in this case be able to absorb the additional supply of unskilled labour 
without necessarily significant changes in the local wage structure or the local output mix. 
Recent empirical evidence that on the job computer use as well as automation expand most 
rapidly in those areas where the relative supply of skilled labour grows fastest points towards 
the importance of this adjustment channel (Beaudry, Doms and Lewis 2006, Doms and Lewis 
2006, and Lewis 2005). 
A number of papers analyse empirically, which of the two channels, changes in output mix or 
changes in production technology, are quantitatively more important in absorbing changes in 
local labour supply (Hanson and Slaughter 2002, Lewis 2004, Dustmann and Glitz 2008, and 
González and Ortega 2007). The overwhelming evidence from these studies shows that the 
biggest part of the absorption of additional workers, roughly around two-thirds, is explained 
by endogenous changes in production technology. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
What do we learn from our above considerations for how we should assess the effects of 
immigration on the labour market, and on wages in particular? First, effects are only to be 
expected if immigrants change the skill structure of the receiving country.  
Second,  if  that  is  the  case,  the  effects  of  immigration  are  differently  felt  across  the 
distribution  of  wages.  In  particular,  it  will  be  those  workers  that  are  most  similar  to 
immigrants in their skill composition that may lose, but workers that possess different skills 
may gain. In this context, a slight modification of the prediction of the distributional impact 
of immigration is required if immigrants and natives are only imperfect substitutes within the 
same (observable) skill group (see Ottaviano and Peri 2006 and Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth  2006).  In  that  case,  an  increase  in  labour  supply  due  to  immigration  will 
primarily  affect  other  immigrants  already  living  in  the  host  country.  Due  to  the  overall 
complementarity  of  immigrants  with  natives,  most  groups  of  natives  actually  experience 
significant  wage  gains  from  immigration  with  only  the  lowest  skilled  groups  actually 
suffering some relatively mild wage cutbacks. However, due to their higher substitutability, 
the detrimental effect from newly arriving immigrants on the wages of existing immigrants 
that are estimated in these studies are substantial. 
Third, whether we believe that the overall effects on wages of resident workers (i.e. the effect 
on the average native wage in our economy) is positive, zero or negative, and the magnitude   7 
of these effects, depends on our views about the elasticity of capital supply. If capital is 
supplied perfectly elastically, then migration does have wage effects, but these are negative 
for workers who compete with immigrants and positive for workers who do not. Overall, at 
the margin, the effect on the overall average wages is always zero. Due to the migration 
surplus, the average wage effect for natives, however, may even be positive. Thus, migration 
may in this setting harm some, but it will benefit others (see Dustmann, Frattini and Preston 
2008, for more detail). 
Fourth,  there  are  alternative  adjustment  mechanisms  besides  wages  that  may  play  an 
important  part  in  an  economy’s  response  to  immigrant  inflows.  If  we  allow  for  multiple 
industries and (some) fixed output prices through, for instance, trade, then migration, even if 
changing the skill structure of the economy, may not affect wages at all, but be absorbed 
through changes in the industry structure and the output mix. 
Fifth, even if the industry structure remains unchanged, an alteration in the skill mix induced 
by immigration may be absorbed at constant wages by endogenous changes in production 
technologies. 
Accordingly, theory provides us with a multitude of different effects immigration may have 
on  the  labour  market.  The  key  question  that  arises  for  particular  countries  is  now  how 
immigration  actually  impacts  the  particular  economy  in  reality?  For  economists,  this 
translates into the question as to how the effect of immigration on native employment and 
wages  can  be  estimated,  what  the  problems  of  empirical  assessment  are,  and  what  the 
empirical  evidence  is.  Below  we  will  discuss  these  challenges  and  how  they  can  be 
addressed.  The  problems  that  arise  in  analysis  are  quite  similar  whether  we  wish  to 
investigate the effects immigration may have on wages, or for instance the technology. As the 
issue most intensively discussed are wage effects, we will illustrate the empirical problems 
for estimating these. 
 
3.  Measuring the Immigrant Impact on the Labour Market 
To understand what is involved in answering these questions, let us focus on wages, and let 
us  assume  that  we  have  one  big  immigration  wave  in  one  particular  year  t.  The  analyst 
observes the wage in the economy before migration takes place (year  1 - t ), and the wage 
after migration has taken place (year  1 + t ). One way to assess the effect of migration is to 
compare average wages in the years  1 + t  and  1 - t ,   1 1 - + - t t w w . However, it is obvious that 
this will not answer the question how migration has impacted on wages of resident workers 
because other mechanisms like the economic cycle, technology etc, will also have affected 
wages after migration. What the analyst would want to compare is the wage change before 
and after migration  1 1 - + - t t w w  (which is observed) with the wage change that would have 
taken place had migration not occurred  1 1 * - + - t t w w , and to relate this to the magnitude of 
immigration, which could be measured by the change in the stock of immigrants,  1 1 - + - t t I I . 
The effect immigration has on native wages is then the parameter    8 
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The problem is the hypothetical wage  * 1 + t w  – which is not observed as we do not observe 
wages in the hypothetical absence of migration. This number is what we call the missing 
counterfactual. In order to obtain an estimate of the effects immigration has on wages, this 
counterfactual  has  to  be  re-constructed.  In  essence,  the  entire  empirical  literature  on  the 
impact  of  migration  is  concerned  with  re-constructing  this  missing  counterfactual.  Re-
construction will always require some assumptions – we call these assumptions identification 
assumptions.  How  credible  these  identification  assumptions  are  determines  how  much 
credibility we should give to the results of empirical work.  
So how can we re-construct this missing counterfactual? One way to do this is to basically 
slice the labour market in different sub-markets, and compare wage changes in markets that 
experienced  in-migration,  and  markets  that  did  not.  The  most  common  approach  in  the 
literature to achieve this is to distinguish between different regional labour markets. 
Suppose for instance that a receiving country has two regions, the North and the South, and 
that the North experienced less in-migration than the South in year t. Then one could utilise 
the variation in in-migration between the two regions to compute the parameter of interest. 
Using our notation above, and adding to notation by distinguishing wages in the South and 
North through indices S and N, one could compute 
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
1 1 1 1

















I I I I
w w w w
- + - +




and use this as an estimate of the effect of immigration on wages.  
There is a remaining problem with this approach: Immigrants are typically not randomly 
allocated across the regions of the receiving country; they rather choose where to go, and they 
are likely to choose that region that experiences the highest wage growth. The immigration 
inflow to either region,  1 1 - + - t t I I , will thus be determined by the expected increase in wages 
in either region,  ) ( 1 1 - + - t t w w E . Suppose the region with the higher wage growth is the South, 
and that immigrants correctly expect this, leading to a larger inflow into the South.  In that 
case,  our  estimate  above  would  give  us  a  positive  number  (suggesting  that  immigration 
increases wages) even if the causal effect of immigration on wage were equal to zero. 
To  circumvent  this  problem,  we  can  choose  different  avenues.  First,  in  particular 
circumstances,  it  may  be  that  immigrants  have  no  choice  of  initial  settlement,  and  are 
allocated to particular areas. This is for instance the case with immigrant dispersal policies in 
Sweden  (Edin,  Fredriksson  and  Aslund  2003)  and  Denmark  (Damm  2006).  These 
government  policies  are  a  source  of  exogenous  regional  allocation  of  immigrants  by 
assigning them to particular local labour market upon arrival and in that way preventing the 
immigrants from endogenously moving to those areas that offer the most favourable labour 
market condition. For Germany, Glitz (2006) takes advantage of a similar policy in which a   9 
particular  group  of  immigrants,  so  called  ethnic  German  immigrants,  were  exogenously 
allocated to specific regions by the authorities based on fixed quotas in order to ensure an 
even distribution across the country. As predicted by the previous example, he finds evidence 
for an endogenous self-selection to the most attractive areas which would lead to a downward 
bias of the effect of immigration on local unemployment rates and wages. 
A  second  possibility  is  to  predict  the  allocation  of  immigrants  to  our  two  regions  using 
variables that are not correlated with the expected shock to wages in the future. One such 
variable  could  be  the  historical  settlement  pattern  of  immigrants,  making  use  of  the 
observation that immigrants tend to settle where other individuals from their community have 
settled  before  (see  Bartel  1989,  or  Jaeger  2007).  Under  the  assumption  that  these  past 
migration decisions are unrelated to contemporary, transitory wage shocks, it is then possible 
to obtain a measure of immigrant inflows that is exogenous with respect to current wage 
shocks and allows the identification of the “true” causal impact of immigration on wages. 
This procedure, which is typically implemented by using past immigrant concentrations as an 
instrumental variable for contemporary changes in immigrant stocks, has found widespread 
use in the immigration literature, for instance by Altonji and Card (1991), Hunt (1992), Card 
(2001), and Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005). 
A last problem arises from the fact that local labour markets are not closed economies and 
workers are free to move in or out. If immigration does drive down local wages for certain 
skill groups then one would expect there to be pressure for currently resident workers of that 
skill type to move elsewhere to gain higher wages. This will tend to disperse the wage impact 
of immigration throughout the national economy and undermine the ability to identify the 
wage impact from looking at effects within localities. It leads to estimates of the effect of 
immigration on wages and employment of workers currently residing in local labour markets 
that are not as negative as the effects which one would obtain without internal migration 
responses.  Whether  this  is  a  serious  problem  remains  disputed.  While  Wright,  Ellis  and 
Reibel (1997), Card and DiNardo (2000), and Card (2001, 2005) find little to no evidence for 
this phenomenon, Filer (1992), Frey (1995, 1996), Borjas (2003, 2006) and Hatton and Tani 
(2005) consider out-migration of natives a far more important factor. 
Slicing  the  labour  market  by  region  is  one  way  to  estimate  wage  effect  of  immigration. 
Another possibility is to slice the labour market by occupation or skill group, and using the 
fact that immigration happens to a different extent in different skill groups for estimation. 
Borjas  (2003)  defines  skill  groups  by  experience  and  education  and  discards  regional 
variation,  using  only  variation  in  inflows  across  these  experience-education  cells.  This 
strategy  allows  him  to  address  criticism  that  immigration  may  lead  to  out-migration  of 
natives of particular regions, thus dispersing the effect of immigration across the national 
economy.  It  also  addresses  the  problem  of  selection  of  immigrants  into  regions  that  do 
economically  well.  However,  the  problem  remains  that  those  individuals  immigrate  that 
belong to skill groups which do very well. Furthermore, and more importantly, this approach 
depends on the assumption that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within pre-
defined skill categories – an assumption that may be violated if immigrants downgrade in an   10
unpredictable manner, which is what we find for the UK (see also Weiss and Eckstein 2004, 
for evidence for Israel). We will come back to this later on. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Illustration and Evidence 
We now come back to the initial question of whether or not immigration lowers wages, and if 
so, for whom – a question that seems to raise some concern in the population (see Figure 1). 
Similar conceptual problems and similar solutions can be applied to studying effects on other 
economic  outcomes  than  wages,  e.g.  prices,  the  housing  market,  technology,  and  output 
structure. Space limitations forbid discussing all this literature. We therefore illustrate briefly 
empirical results of some studies for wage effects for some European countries and the U.S.. 
We then discuss the existing literature for the UK.
 2  
 
4.1 International Empirical Evidence  
The theoretical discussion in Section 2 has shown that, within the model framework we set 
out, if capital is supplied elastically immigration has at most no effect on natives’ wages, and 
may have a positive impact on natives’ average wages as long as immigrants differ from 
natives in their skill composition. Nevertheless, if there is any wage change, some groups of 
natives  lose  and  others  gain.  Indeed,  many  recent  empirical  papers,  adopting  different 
identification strategies, fail to find a negative  impact of immigration  on natives’ wages.  
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1996) use the spatial approach outlined above, as well as an 
alternative  strategy  that  slices  the  national  labour  market  across  industries,  to  study  the 
impact of immigration on average wages of young Austrians. Both methodologies show that 
immigration had a positive impact on natives’ wages. Similarly Friedberg (2001) investigates 
the issue for Israel identifying different labour markets on a national level along occupational 
lines, and using alternatively individual and aggregate level data. In both cases she estimates 
a positive impact of immigration on Israelis’ wages, although the estimates from aggregated 
data  are  not  statistically  significant.  Carrasco,  Jimeno  and  Ortega  (2008)  adopt  a 
methodology  similar  to  Borjas  (2003),  where  the  different  labour  markets  are  defined  as 
education-gender- and experience cells, to Spain.  They fail to find any significant effect of 
immigration on average wages. Even for the U.S. while earlier papers tended to find some 
modest (e.g. Altonji and Card 1991, Card 2001) or more sizeable (e.g. Borjas 2003) negative 
impact on native wages, more recent papers have challenged these results. Ottaviano and Peri 
(2006), building on the approach in Borjas (2003) and allowing for imperfect substitutability 
between immigrants and native workers even within the same education and age cell show 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the labour market impact of immigration 
see Okkerse (2008).   11
that in the period 1990-2004 immigration increased the average wage of U.S. native workers. 
This positive effect arises from a relatively large positive effect on wages of more highly 
educated  native  workers  and  a  slight  negative  effect  on  wages  of  native  high  school 
dropouts.
3  In  another  recent  paper  Peri  (2007)  applies  a  similar  approach  to  the  case  of 
California, the U.S. state with the highest percentage of immigrants in its workforce, most of 
whom  with  very  low  education.  Even  in  this  case  he  finds  that  immigration  caused  an 
increase in the average wage of U.S. born workers. 
What has happened in the UK? The next section describes some key characteristics of the 
immigrant population in the UK, and shows that the results of some recent empirical studies 
fit with the predictions of our simple theoretical model of Section 2.1. 
 
4.2 Evidence for the UK 
In an early paper Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005) investigate the effect immigration has 
on  wages  and  employment,  using  data  from  the  British  LFS.  Their  analysis  on  the 
employment  effects  focuses  on  the  period  1983-2000,  while  for  wages  the  period  they 
consider is dictated by the wage information available in the LFS which starts to report wages 
only from 1992 onwards. The approach they use is the spatial correlation approach, combined 
with an instrumenting strategy for the fraction of immigrants in the different regions based on 
earlier information of immigrant settlement – see Section 2.3.  
Their results show that immigration over the period considered had no significant effect on 
the overall employment of natives. They then analyse separately the impact of immigration 
on three education groups: those with no formal qualifications (low education), those with O-
levels  or  equivalent  qualifications  (intermediate  education),  and  those  with  A-levels  or 
university degrees (advanced education). The disaggregated analysis shows detrimental and 
statistically  significant  effects  on  employment,  unemployment,  and  participation  of  the 
intermediate group. For natives in this group an increase in immigration of the size of 1% of 
the native population would lead to a decrease of 1.8 percentage points in the employment 
rate,  a  decrease  of  1.1  percentage  points  in  the  participation  rate  and  an  increase  of  1 
percentage  point  in  the  unemployment  rate.  These  negative  effects  are  however 
counterbalanced by an increase in employment of natives with advanced education. For this 
highly educated group an inflow of immigrant of the same size would lead to an increase of 
1.1 percentage points in the employment and participation rate, and would have no effect on 
the unemployment rate. They fail to find any significant impact on natives with no formal 
qualification. The analysis on wage effects is limited by data availability to the period 1992-
2000. The estimated results are statistically not significant, but tend to show a positive impact 
of immigration on average wages.  Thus their study seems to suggest that there are some 
                                                 
3 See Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2008) for a critical evaluation of this study. 
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detrimental  employment  effects,  but  that  theses  are  particularly  affecting  natives  with 
intermediate education levels, and they are compensated by the positive employment effects 
on the highly qualified. On the other hand, there is no evidence for negative wage effects; 
rather immigration, if anything, would lead to slightly positive effects on wages.  
In a recent  study, Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2006) investigate to what extent the 
immigrant inflows to the UK over the period 1975 to 2005 have affected both native and 
immigrant average real wages. Rather than relying on regional variation to identify the wage 
effects, the authors follow Borjas (2003) in distinguishing skill groups by education and age 
on the national level. The crucial point of their study, though, is to allow immigrants and 
natives within the same education and age group to be imperfect substitutes in the production 
process.  Using  data  from  the  LFS  as  well  as  the  General  Household  Survey  (GHS)  and 
starting from a multi-level CES production function, Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 
(2006) first estimate elasticities of substitution between immigrants and natives and between 
workers in different age and education groups. They then proceed by simulating the effect the 
immigrant inflow to the UK between 1975 and 2005 had on the return to education among 
natives and the overall native-migrant wage differential. Similar to Ottaviano and Peri (2006), 
who carry out a parallel study for the U.S., Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2006) find 
evidence that natives and immigrants are indeed imperfect substitutes within the same age-
education cell with an estimated elasticity of substitution of around 6. Their simulations then 
show that the immigrant inflow to the UK has raised the return to education for natives, and 
thus inequality, by a very modest 0.4% but has increased the native-migrant wage differential 
by 5.5%. This is because immigrants mainly compete with other immigrants in the labour 
market,  hence  impacting  mostly  on  their  wages.  Overall,  the  authors  conclude  that  the 
immigrant impact on the wage distribution of the native population has been small and that 
immigration in the UK primarily impacts the wages of immigrants who are already in the 
country. 
An alternative to explicitly allowing for imperfect substitutability between immigrants and 
natives within skill groups could be to abstain altogether from an explicit pre-allocation of 
immigrants to particular skill groups based on their observable characteristics. This is the 
empirical strategy followed in a very recent paper by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008). 
Using data from the LFS, they study the period between 1997 and 2005, which has been a 
period  of  relatively  high  immigration  to  Britain.  Figure  4  shows  the  net  inflow  of 
international migrants to the UK over the period. Immigration flows have increased sharply 
since  1997  and  have  reached  their  maximum  in  2004,  after  the  EU  enlargement.  These 
inflows  have  resulted  in  a  growth  of  the  share  of  immigrants  in  the  total  working  age 
population of slightly less than 3 percentage points between 1997 and 2005, from 8.5% to 
11.2%. 
[Figure 4] 
Other than in the previous papers, the authors investigate the effect immigration has along the 
distribution of native wages, rather than on wages of different skill groups. They develop an 
empirical model based on a standard production function framework with many skill types,   13
and  where  immigrants  compete  with  natives  not  within  measured  skill  groups,  but  with 
natives that are in the same percentile in the wage distribution. Thus, their empirical approach 
is flexible in the sense that it determines substitutability between immigrants and natives 
according to where immigrants are actually found in the distribution of native wages, rather 
than where they would be assigned according to their observable skills.  
Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) argue that at least for the case of the UK, such pre-
assignment may lead to misleading results. They show that immigrants, and in particular 
recent immigrants who are used for estimation, are extremely well educated. For instance, 
46% of recent immigrants in 2005 had left full time education at age 21 or later. This share 
was only 16% among natives, and 35% among earlier immigrants. However, at the same time 
these immigrants downgrade substantially upon arrival and work in jobs and professions that 
are far below where they would be assigned based on their observable skills. For instance, 
26% of the highly educated recent immigrants were employed in routine and semi-routine 
occupations, the two lowest paid occupation categories. However, that was case for only 11% 
of earlier immigrants and 5% of natives with the same level of education. The authors show 
also that the distribution of immigrants along the native wage distribution is, despite their 
higher  level  of  education,  heavily  skewed  towards  the  low  end.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
distribution that would result if immigrants were allocated along the native wage distribution 
according to observable skill levels would be skewed towards the top end of the distribution. 
They conclude from this evidence that at least for the UK, pre-allocation based on observed 
skills may allocate immigrants to compete with native in skill groups where in reality they do 
not compete.  
Their  empirical  evidence  does,  in  line  with  where  immigrants  are  in  the  native  wage 
distribution, illustrate a negative wage effect at the low end of the distribution, but a positive 
wage effect further up the distribution – exerting wage effects almost exactly as implied by 
where immigrant are found in the native distribution, and very different from where they 
would be allocated according to their observed skills.  
The effect on average wages is positive, quite in line with their earlier work for an earlier 
period. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) offer three explanations for this positive effect. 
The first mechanism through which immigration may generate positive wage effects is the 
conventional  equilibrium  “immigration  surplus”  argument  we  presented  in  Section  2.1. 
However, simulations conducted by the authors show that immigration inflows of the size 
observed in the data are not sufficient to produce wage effects of the estimated magnitude. 
Alternative explanations are therefore based on disequilibrium assumptions, where workers 
are  not  paid  the  value  of  their  marginal  product  on  the  local  labour  market.  The  first 
disequilibrium argument is similar to the idea of Borjas (2001) that immigration “greases the 
wheels”  of  the  labour  market.  In  Borjas,  efficiency  gains  are  realised  by  immigrants 
equalising differences in the marginal product of labour in different submarkets, and, thus, 
capture the surplus. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) assume that wages deviate from 
their marginal products in submarkets in the pre-migration situation, for instance because of 
institutional  factors  that  determine  equality  of  wages  across  regions  or  occupations,  or 
because of wage rigidity. In this case, and if immigrants go to areas where the differences are   14
largest, a surplus will be realised, which now will be captured by native workers. A further 
explanation is that immigrants are paid a wage below their marginal product. The evidence 
on occupational downgrading of immigrants presented in the paper shows that highly skilled 
immigrants are often employed in typically low-skilled jobs, especially in the first years after 
their arrival. Moreover, higher skilled immigrant workers are expected to be more productive 
than lower skilled native workers, also within the same occupation. Nevertheless they are 
paid the same wage, determined by native productivity. This again generates a surplus which 
is captured by native workers.  
Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) simulate the magnitude of the surplus that is created 
by  each  of  these  mechanisms,  for  the  particular  immigration  over  the  period  considered. 
Although the simulations suggest that none of these mechanisms alone able to generate a 
surplus of the magnitude required explaining the estimated positive wage effect, the authors 
argue that a combination of the three surpluses may generate positive wage effects similar in 
magnitude than those that are observed. 
  
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we briefly review the simplest theoretical model that helps explain the effects 
immigration  has  on  economic  outcomes  of  native  workers  in  the  receiving  country.  Our 
discussion suggests that the way immigration affects outcomes depends crucially on the skill 
structure of immigrants relative to the skill structure of natives, as well as assumptions about 
the elasticity of capital supply. If capital is perfectly elastic, then immigration will not affect 
labour market outcomes of native workers as long as immigrants perfectly resemble natives 
in terms of skills – the economy will absorb the additional labour force simply by expansion.  
If on the other hand immigrants differ from native workers in skill composition, and if we 
exclude other mechanisms of adjustment, then absorption will imply wage adjustments. Who 
gains and who loses from immigration depends on the skill mix of immigrants relative to 
native workers. Thus, immigration will lead to a re-distribution, harming some, but leading to 
gains for others. The average effect immigration has on wages will again depend on the 
assumption we are willing to make about capital supply. If capital supply is perfectly elastic, 
the average wage will not decrease, but may increase if the inflows are sufficiently high due 
to a migration surplus. If capital supply is not perfectly elastic, there will again be an average 
gain for the overall economy, but this is partly captured by the owners of capital, so that 
average wages may decrease. Important in this discussion is to note that the same immigrant 
inflow may affect different recipient countries in a different way, depending on the skill 
structure of the native workforce (and of course of the immigrant inflow).  
We also discuss alternative adjustment mechanisms, through the output mix of the economy 
and technology adjustment. To materialise, these adjustments require a slightly more general 
model of the economy, where some goods are traded. In fact, recent work for the U.S., Spain 
and  Germany  (see  e.g.  Lewis  2004,  2005,  Dustmann  and  Glitz  2008,  and  González  and 
Ortega 2007) suggests that these mechanisms are important.   15
We  point  out the  difficulties  the  analyst  faces  when  attempting  to  empirically  assess  the 
effects immigration has on wages. They key issue here is one of  creating a hypothetical 
situation that would have occurred in the case immigration had not taken place. For the UK, 
we discuss the evidence of three recent papers, all of which do not find evidence for negative 
average wage effects. The paper by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) demonstrates a 
dramatic “downgrading” of immigrants upon arrival, leading to wage competition and wage 
pressure  at  the  low  end  of  the  wage  distribution.  Relating  this  finding  to  the  figure  we 
displayed in the introduction on different population groups’ assessment of the wage effects 
of  immigration,  it  seems  that  the  larger  concern  of  the  low-skilled  population  is  indeed 
justified by the evidence. 
However, the paper also finds that there is an average gain to wages of a magnitude that is 
not  easily  explained  by  simple  surplus  arguments  of  the  type  suggested  by  the  model 
discussion. It seems therefore not unlikely that the standard equilibrium frameworks within 
which  immigration  effects  are  usually  discussed  are  not  capturing  all  the  possible 
mechanisms  by  which  immigration  affects  labour  market  outcomes  of  native  workers  in 
receiving countries. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) discuss some alternative channels 
of surplus creation. This is an important avenue for future work, explaining the perhaps more 
complex effects immigration has on receiving countries through enhancement of efficiency as 
well as complementarity to existing factors of production. 
Such  insights  could  also  be  fruitful  for  a  better  assessment  of  the  broader  impact  of 
immigration on the host economy. One key summary measure often used in the policy debate 
is the effect of immigration on the GDP per capita of the resident non-migrant population. 
These calculations are closely linked and often directly based on estimates of the effect of 
immigration  on  the  wages  of  the  resident  population,  assuming  that  wages  are  a  good 
reflection of the contribution of each worker to the economy. Clearly, the better we are able 
to  understand  and  measure  the  wage  impact  and  the  alternative  adjustment  mechanisms 
discussed in this paper, the more reliable will be the assessment of the overall impact on this 
key  economic  measure.  However,  besides  GDP  per  capita,  there  are  a  number  of  other 
dimensions by which immigration may affect the host country economy, such as the prices of 
goods, the housing market, the availability of public services and the fiscal system which 
equally deserve attention and should be taken into account in the design of suitable migration 
policies. Furthermore, and as emphasised in the paper by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston 
(2008), many of the possible mechanisms by which immigration may generate a surplus are 
not yet well understood and explored. To understand the various ways immigration impacts 
on  the  receiving  country’s  labour  market  and  economy  –  many  of  which  may  be  more 
complex than suggested by simple equilibrium models – is in our view an important avenue 
for future research.   16
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Overall No qualification Low Intermediate High
Source: European Social Survey, 2002
agree strongly agree neither agree nor disagree
disagree disagree strongly
 
The figure shows the distribution of answers of UK residents to the question whether immigrants lower wages. 
The first column reports answers for the whole population, while columns 2-5 report distribution of answers by 
education group.  
High education: university degree or equivalent or postgraduate qualification. 
Intermediate education: a-level, national vocational qualifications level 3/5,or equivalent. 
Low education: gcse, o-level, cse, national vocational qualification level 1/2  or equivalent. 
Source: European Social Survey, first wave, 2002. 
   22
 
 
Figure 2: Wage effects of unskilled immigration   23
 
Figure 3: Employment effects of unskilled immigration   24
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